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UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
OWNER-OPERATOR
INDEPENDENT DRIVERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., BRIAN McGRATH and
ARTHUR SHAW, Individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
BURLINGTON
MOTOR CARRIERS, INC.
Defendant.
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Case No.
COMPLAINT
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CLASS
ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES
The
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. ("OOIDA"),
Brian McGrath ("Plaintiff McGrath") and Arthur Shaw
("Plaintiff Shaw") (collectively "Plaintiffs,")
bring this action against Defendant Burlington Motor Carriers,
Inc. its agents, affiliates, or successors in interest ("BMC"
or "Defendant") seeking declaratory, injunctive and
monetary relief on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 14704(a)(1) and (2)
and 49 C.F.R. § 376 et seq., and allege:
JURISDICTION
1. The causes
of action alleged arise under 49 U.S.C. §§ 14102 and
14704(a)(1) and (2) which authorize private actions for injunctive
relief and damages for violations of 49 C.F.R. § 376 ("Part
376").
2. Jurisdiction
is granted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question
jurisdiction) and 1337 (proceedings arising under an act of Congress
regulating commerce).
3. This Court
has jurisdiction over Defendant as its principal place of business
and corporate headquarters are in Daleville, Indiana and it is
conducting business in Indiana.
4. Venue is proper
in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that a substantial
part of the events giving rise to the claims raised in this action
occurred in this district.
PARTIES
5. BMC is a Delaware
corporation doing business in Indiana. BMC is a regulated motor
carrier providing transportation of property in interstate commerce
under authority of the U.S. Department of Transportation. For
all periods of time material to this action, Defendant is and
has been an "authorized carrier" within the meaning
of 49 C.F.R. § 376.2(a).
6. BMC transports
property in equipment leased from independent truckers (known
as "owner?operators") including Plaintiff Shaw and Plaintiff
McGrath and others similarly situated. Under federal law, authorized
carriers such as BMC may perform transportation in equipment that
they do not own only pursuant to a written lease meeting the requirements
of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12. 49 C.F.R. § 376.11(a); see also
49 U.S.C. § 14102(a). Moreover, authorized motor carriers
must adhere to the required lease provisions. 49 C.F.R. §
376.12.
7. Plaintiff Owner-Operator
Independent Drivers Association ("OOIDA") is a business
association of persons and entities who own and operate motor
vehicles, commonly known as "owner?operators." Owner?operators
are traditionally small business truckers who own and operate
a truck tractor (of a tractor?trailer combination). The owner?operator
leases his tractor and driving services to a motor carrier (such
as Defendant), agreeing to move items for the motor carrier in
interstate commerce in exchange for specified compensation. OOIDA
is a not?for?profit corporation incorporated in the State of Missouri,
with its headquarters located at 311 R.D. Mize Road, P.O. Box
1000, Grain Valley, Missouri 64029. OOIDA was founded in 1973
and now has over 60,000 members residing in all fifty (50) states
and in Canada. OOIDA brings this action in a representative capacity
and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all owner?operators.
8. Plaintiff McGrath,
a citizen of Mississippi, is an owner?operator who resides at
1107 Cherry Street, Summit, Mississippi.
9. Plaintiff Shaw,
a citizen of Florida, is an owner?operator who resides at 33E
Windtree Lane, Winter Garden, Florida.
10. Plaintiffs
Shaw and McGrath, and other similarly situated owner?operators
are "owners" and "lessors" of "equipment"
as defined in 49 C.F.R. § 376.2(b), (d) & (f).
REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS
11. A person injured
on account of an authorized carrier's failure to comply with the
federal leasing regulations may bring an action seeking injunctive
relief and damages against such authorized carrier pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(1) and (2). A successful plaintiff may
recover attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §
14704(e).
12. Plaintiffs
Shaw and McGrath entered substantively identical federally?regulated
lease agreements (the "Lease Agreement") with Defendant.
A genuine copy of the Lease Agreement entered between Defendant
and Plaintiff Shaw is attached as Exhibit "A." Upon
information and belief, this Lease Agreement is substantially
the same in all material respects as lease agreements entered
with members of the putative class.
13. In the event
that an authorized carrier provides insurance to the owner?operator
for the operation of the vehicle, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(2)
provides that the authorized carrier must provide a certificate
of insurance containing "the name of the insurer, the policy
number, the effective dates of the policy, the amounts and types
of coverage, the cost to the lessor [owner?operator] for each
type of coverage, and the deductible amount for each type of coverage
for which the lessor [owner?operator] might be liable." This
provision also requires that "[i]f the lessor [owner?operator]
purchases any insurance coverage for the operation of the leased
equipment from or through the authorized carrier, the lease shall
specify that the authorized carrier will provide the lessor with
a copy of each policy upon the request of the lessor," (emphasis
added).
14. 49 C.F.R.
§ 376.12(j)(1) provides that the lease "specify who
is responsible for providing any other insurance coverage for
the operation of the leased equipment, such as bobtail insurance."
In addition, "If the authorized carrier will make a charge
back to the lessor [owner?operator] for any of this insurance,
the lease shall specify the amount which will be charged-back
...." Id.
15. 49 C.F.R.
§ 376.12(h) provides that "[t]he lease shall clearly
specify all items that may be initially paid for by the authorized
carrier, but ultimately deducted from the lessor's compensation
at the time of payment of settlement, together with a recitation
as to how the amount of each item is to be computed." When
deductions are taken from an owner-operator's compensation then
that individual "shall be afforded copies of those documents
which are necessary to determine the validity of the charge."
Id. This provision is applicable to all charge back items including
charge backs for various forms of insurance coverages identified
in 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j).
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
16. This action
is brought by Plaintiffs as a national class action, on their
own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated.
17. Class
Description. Plaintiffs represent a class (hereinafter
"Class") consisting of all owner-operators in the United
States who have entered federally regulated leases with BMC, or
its authorized agents or business affiliates.
18. Impracticability
of Joinder. Upon information and belief, there are over
one thousand (1,000) individual owner?operators who are members
of this Class. These individual owner?operators are residents
of various states and travel continuously, and are, therefore
widely dispersed geographically. Thus, joinder of all potential
Class Members would be impracticable.
19. Commonality.
BMC has acted toward these Class Members in a way that affects
all members of the Class similarly and, accordingly, questions
of fact and law are common to the Class, as are questions of the
liability of BMC, or the appropriate nature of injunctive relief.
20. Typicality.
The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the
potential Class as a whole.
21. Fair
and Adequate Representation. Plaintiffs are capable of
fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the Class. Additionally,
OOIDA has previously participated as class representative on behalf
of owner?operators in several cases, and counsel for Plaintiffs
(The Cullen Law Firm, PLLC) has been involved in numerous class
actions around the country.
22. Class
Certification Appropriate Under Rule 23(b)(2). Defendant
has acted and/or failed to act on grounds generally applicable
to the potential class as a whole, as described further in this
Complaint. Thus, injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate
with respect to the potential class as a whole, making class certification
appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
23. Class
Certification Appropriate Under Rule 23(b)(3). The questions
of law enumerated in the counts below are common to all potential
class members, as described in paragraph 21 supra, and predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members which are
essentially limited to the amount of damages due each member.
Therefore, a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein.
24. Additional
Factors Favoring Class Certification. Other factors favoring
the certification of this suit as a class action include:
(a) the amounts in controversy for individual owner-operators
are relatively small, so that individual members of the Class
would not find it cost?effective to bring individual claims;
(b) requiring individuals to prosecute separate actions would
substantially impair or impede the individual members' ability
to protect their interests;
(c) upon information and belief, there is no litigation already
commenced by Class Members concerning the causes of action
raised in this Complaint;
(d) it is desirable to concentrate the individual members'
claims in one forum because, given the amount in controversy,
to require these claims to be brought in separate forums would
effectively prevent individuals from bringing claims to recover
their funds;
(e) no substantial difficulties are likely to be encountered
in managing this class action;
(f) Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized essentially
the same standard lease agreement for years and the conduct
at issue arises from this agreement; and
(g) Plaintiffs are represented by The Cullen Law Firm, PLLC,
which has the experience of representing their clients in
numerous class actions involving owner?operators and other
small business truckers nationwide.
FACTUAL
ALLEGATIONS
25. Plaintiffs
Shaw and McGrath and others similarly situated are owner?operators
who leased their equipment, a truck tractor and driving services,
to BMC within the meaning of 49 C.F.R. § 376.2(e).
26. Plaintiff
Shaw was leased with and operated for BMC from October 1997 to
June 2000. See Exhibit A. Plaintiff McGrath was leased with and
operated for BMC from May 1997 to October 1999. These leases and
the leases between BMC and other similarly situated owner?operators,
constitute "lease[s]" as defined in 49 C.F.R. §
376.2(e).
27. Upon information
and belief, the leasing agreements between BMC and Plaintiffs
Shaw and McGrath are substantively the same to the leasing agreements
entered between BMC and other similarly situated owner?operators.
28. The lease
agreements entered between Plaintiffs Shaw and McGrath and BMC
fail to meet the requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 in that
a number of provisions required by that regulation are missing
from the lease and a number of provisions included in the lease
are in conflict with that regulation.
29. Pursuant to
their lease agreements, BMC required Plaintiffs Shaw and McGrath
to obtain various types of insurance coverage. Defendant obtained
various insurance coverage for Plaintiffs and deducted amounts
to pay for such insurance from their weekly or periodic compensation.
BMC deducted amounts from Plaintiffs Shaw and McGrath for physical
damage, bobtail, occupational accident and workers compensation
insurance. Upon information and belief, each member of the prospective
class has similarly purchased one or more of these types of insurance
from or through Defendant, and deductions were made for said insurance
from income or escrow accounts.
30. Despite the
deductions for various insurance, and its obligations under 49
C.F.R. § 376.12 (h) & (j), Defendant provided Plaintiff
Shaw with only one certificate of insurance during his lease term
with BMC. Moreover, the one certificate provided to him did not
comply with the law as it does not provide the cost of the insurance
coverage as required by 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(2). Upon information
and belief, each member of the prospective class has similarly
not received insurance certificates from BMC to which they were
entitled.
31. Plaintiff
Shaw has requested BMC to provide copies of insurance policies
and certificates of insurance pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h)
and (j). Plaintiff Shaw has not received any response from BMC.
In fact, BMC expressly refused correspondence that sought insurance
information it was required to provide to Plaintiff Shaw.
32. Plaintiff
McGrath similarly requested that BMC provide copies of the insurance
policies for which deductions where made to his income or escrows.
Plaintiff McGrath did not received these policies from BMC.
33. Defendant's
lease authorizes deductions from Plaintiffs Shaw's and McGrath's
compensation to pay "premiums" for the various types
of insurance coverages provided from or through Defendant. See
Exhibit A at pp. 2, 4A, and 4, 6B and C. Upon information and
belief, the averments of this paragraph are substantively the
same for all members of the Class.
34. During the
leases between Plaintiffs Shaw and McGrath and Defendant, BMC
was deducting various amounts for that insurance from their weekly
compensation. Upon information and belief, the averments of this
paragraph are substantively the same for all members of the Class.
35. The amounts
deducted by BMC from Plaintiffs Shaw's and McGrath's compensation
were substantially greater than the insurance "premiums"
paid by BMC for said insurance coverage and which it agreed to
deduct from their compensation. Upon information and belief, the
averments of this paragraph are substantively the same for all
members of the Class.
COUNT I
FAILURE TO PROVIDE INSURANCE AND CHARGE BACK INFORMATION
(in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h) and (j))
36. Plaintiffs
reallege and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through
35.
37. Defendant
has failed and fails to comply with its obligations under 49 C.F.R.
§ 376.12(h) and (j)(1), in that the lease fails to specify
the amount that will be charged back to the owner?operator for
insurance or how that amount is to be calculated.
38. Defendant
has failed to comply with its obligations under 49 C.F.R. §
376.12(j)(2) in that Defendant has failed to provide Plaintiffs
Shaw and McGrath and others similarly situated with appropriate
certificates of insurance or with copies of insurance policies
upon request.
39. Defendant's
failure to disclose the required insurance and charge back information
is harmful to owner?operators because it prevents them from ascertaining
whether they are being over charged for charge back items including
insurance and/or subjected to unlawful reductions in compensation.
This prevents owner?operators from effectively judging the benefit
of their bargain and from making an informed choice whether to
enter or continue the lease agreement or to allow such deductions.
Defendant's failure to comply with 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h)
and (j) placed Plaintiffs Shaw and McGrath and others similarly
situated in a position where they have neither the documentation
nor information "necessary to determine the validity of the
charge[s]."
40. As a direct
and proximate result of these violations of federal law, the rights
of Plaintiffs Shaw and McGrath, and other similarly situated owner?operators,
have been violated.
COUNT II
UNLAWFUL DEDUCTIONS FROM COMPENSATION UNDER LEASE AGREEMENT
(in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h) and (j))
41.
Plaintiffs re?allege and incorporate the allegations of paragraphs
1 through 35 above.
42. Defendant
has engaged in a pattern and practice of making deductions from
owner?operators' compensation for insurance and other items not
properly disclosed or enumerated and in amounts not properly set
forth or explained in the Lease Agreements. Monies for those items
have been and are unlawfully withheld and/or deducted from Plaintiffs
Shaw and McGrath and the Class in violation of 49 C.F.R.§
376.12(h) and (j).
43. As a direct
and proximate result of BMC's violations of Part 376, owner?operators
are deprived of sums rightfully belonging to them and have incurred
substantial monetary damages. BMC's failures are actionable. 49
U.S.C. § 14704(a)(1) and (2).
PRAYERS
FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs,
OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, ARTHUR SHAW, BRIAN
McGRATH, individually or in a representative capacity, and for
all others similarly situated, respectfully request that this
Court:
1. Certify a class
comprised of owner-operators of motor vehicle equipment who, at
any time on or after March 21, 1997, were parties to a lease agreement
regulated by Part 376 with BMC, or who enter a lease agreement
regulated by Part 376 with BMC at any time during the pendency
of this proceeding;
2. Enter a declaratory
judgment that BMC's lease agreement as set forth in Exhibit A
fails to conform to the requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12
in that several provisions required by that regulation are missing
from the lease agreement and several provisions included in the
lease agreement conflict with a motor carrier's responsibilities
under that regulation;
3. Enter an injunction
enjoining and restraining Defendant from performing regulated
transportation in equipment it does not own unless and until it
enters written lease agreements meeting the requirements of 49
C.F.R. § 376.12;
4. Enter an Order
requiring Defendant to deliver to Plaintiff Shaw, Plaintiff McGrath
and all members of the Class all insurance information and documentation
for the Class as required by 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h) and (j);
5. Enter a declaratory
judgment that Defendant has violated 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 (h)
and (j) by charging Plaintiffs Shaw and McGrath and all members
of the class amounts for insurance coverage in excess of the premiums
for such coverage;
6. Enter an Order
that Defendant provide Plaintiffs an accounting of all transactions
involving deductions from compensation for insurance, and requiring
Defendant to recite how each deduction from compensation was calculated
while providing all documentation necessary to confirm the validity
of such transactions pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 (h) and
(j);
7. Enter judgment
against Defendant in favor of individual class members for actual
damages for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 14704(a)(2), including pre- and post-judgment interest,
as allowed by law;
8. Enter an Order
awarding restitution to the individual class members of all amounts
wrongly withheld as a result of deductions related to insurance.
9. Create a common
fund made up of all damages owed by Defendant to individual Class
Members;
10. Award class
counsel reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in the
prosecution of this action to be paid out of the common fund;
11. Award class
counsel reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 14704(e); and
12. Enjoin Defendant
from any acts of retaliation, harassment, or intimidation against
Plaintiffs, the putative class and others who may assist and/or
participate in this action;
13. Award such
other relief as this Court may deem to be just and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Rule
38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand
a trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury.
| Date:
March _____, 2001 |
Respectfully
submitted,
_______________________________
PAUL D. CULLEN, SR., ESQ.
JOYCE E. MAYERS, ESQ.
JAMES J. WHITTLE, ESQ.
THE CULLEN LAW FIRM, PLLC
1101 30th Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20007
Telephone: (202) 944-8600
Facsimile: (202) 944-8611
________________________________
DAVID J. CARR, ESQ.
STEVEN J. MOSS, ESQ.
JULIE CONRAD, ESQ.
JOHNSON SMITH PENCE & HEATH LLP
Suite 1800
One Indiana Square
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Telephone: (317) 634-9777
Facsimile: (317) 636-9061
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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